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Abstract Although US and European research has doc-
umented improvement in earnings quality associated with
corporate governance characteristics, the situation in Latin
America is questionable, given the business environment in
which firms operate, which is characterized by controlling
family ownership and weak legal protection. The purpose
of this study is to examine the relation between the internal
mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Earnings Man-
agement measured by discretionary accrual. We use a
sample of listed Latin American non-financial companies
from the period 2006–2009. Our results show how in the
Latin American context the role of external directors is
limited and that Boards which meet more frequently take a
more active position in the monitoring of insiders, so
showing a lower use of manipulative practices. In addition,
we find a non-linear relation between insider ownership
and discretionary accruals, also pointing to the fact that
ownership concentration may be a manipulative practices
constrictor mechanism only when the ownership of main
shareholders is moderate. The findings have important
policy implications since this is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first study to analyze the relation between
the effectiveness of the government and the earnings
management behavior. As policy implications, we docu-
ment how when a country implements controls aimed at
reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law or
improving the effectiveness of government, this leads to a
reduction in firm earnings management.
Keywords Board of Directors  Corporate governance 
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Introduction
In recent years large accounting fraud uncovered in the
stock markets has once again confirmed the existence of
ethical failures and the importance of transparency and
reliability of the financial information provided to markets
(Lang and Lundholm 2000). The regulatory response to
financial scandals has been to take measures to protect
information transparency, mitigate conflicts of interest and
ensure the independence of auditors, all in order to protect
the investors interests’ and increase the confidence of
capital markets (Leuz et al. 2003). A weak governance
structure may provide an opportunity for managers to
engage in behavior that would eventually result in a lower
quality of reported earnings, which is a strong indication of
a serious decay in business ethics.
Since the studies published by Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983), it has been assumed
that both, the role of the board of directors and ownership
structure, are crucial in monitoring managerial activity, as
they are capable of reducing agency costs resulting from
the alignment of ownership and management interests.
Thus, several studies document a significant relation
between the characteristics of the board of directors and the
integrity of accounting information (Rahman and Ali 2006;
Patelli and Prencipe 2007; Hashim and Devi 2008). Some
other studies analyze the effect of the internal ownership
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and shareholding concentration held by major shareholders
on the quality of financial results (Lefort 2005; Kim and Yi
2006; Price et al. 2006). All these studies relate mainly to
Anglo-Saxon countries, where outside investors are well-
protected by the legal system (e.g., United States, United
Kingdom), the level of transparency is high and most listed
firm’ present widely held ownership structures.
The above scenarios cannot be readily applied, however,
to the case of Latin America and many other countries
characterized by weak legal protection of minority share-
holders’ interests and concentrated ownership structures. In
the Latin American context, the ownership structure of
listed firms is characterized by high levels of concentrated
ownership where many firms are directly controlled by one
of the industrial or financial conglomerates that operate in
the region (Lopez and Saona 2005; Cespedes et al. 2008),
through the use of pyramidal structures that enable con-
trolling shareholders to separate their voting and cash flow
rights (Mendes and Mazzer 2005), and by the notable
presence of family groups among such owners (La Porta
et al. 1999; Castan˜eda 2000a, b; Rabelo and Coutinho
2001; Santiago et al. 2009). Moreover, the control exerted
by these family owners is not usually limited solely to their
participation in the firms’ ownership since they usually
play an active role in management (La Porta et al. 1999).
Additionally, Boards of Directors in Latin American firms
are not as independent as those in developed countries,
making them less effective in monitoring the decisions
taken by managers (Santiago and Baek 2003; Lefort 2005;
Helland and Sykuta 2005).
According to the approaches set out, this paper’s main
objective is to analyze the relation between the internal
mechanisms of CG and EM in firms listed on the main
Latin American stock markets, specifically, on the markets
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, during the period
2006–2009. These countries have not been strangers to the
initiatives of practically all Western countries since the
promulgation in 2000 of the Sarbanes–Oxley in the U.S.
and it seems appropriate to verify empirically the effects of
CG mechanisms such as ownership structure and board
of directors in these countries. Therefore, another objective
of this paper is to analyze the relation between board and
earnings management in this type of context, where both
the predominant agency conflict and the institutional
environment differ from those in the Anglo-Saxon and
Continental European markets.
The specific characteristics of Latin American countries
make it also interesting to analyze the country govern-
ability level, because corruption is prevalent in emerging
countries, affecting the effective function of governments
and economies (Gill and Kharas 2007; Aidt 2009). The
implementation of controls aimed at reducing corruption,
to strengthen the rule of law or to improve the effectiveness
of the government in a country could lead to a reduction in
opportunistic behavior and, consequently, could reduce the
earnings management practices in firms. Thus, by using a
government index proposed by the previous literature we
will test if those countries that control corruption have a
stronger rule of law and higher effectiveness of their
government reduce the earnings management behavior.
This study contributes to the growing body of literature
related to CG in the following ways. First, it extends the
very limited research on the relation between CG and EM
in Latin America and provides a more comprehensive
picture of this association. Second, it provides further
evidence by analyzing the empirical evidence in a Latin
American context, where the Boards of Directors, legal
investors’ protection, the presence of reference investors
and the threat of corporate takeover differs substantially
from other regions of the world, especially in those coun-
tries with developed markets. Third, our study extends the
literature to ethical aspects that are scarce and have not
been tested yet in the relation between the internal mech-
anisms of CG and EM in Latin America, such as corrup-
tion, rule of law, and government effectiveness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in
next section, the study hypotheses are developed; in third
section, we present the design and research methodology;
in fourth section, we show the statistical results; in fifth
section, we discuss the results, the limitations, and future
lines of research and; finally, in last section we present the
main conclusions of our study.
Previous Literature and Development of Hypotheses
Ownership Structure
Ownership structure is an internal control mechanism that
focuses on the aspects that define the ownership of the
company and refers to the manner in which titles or rights
of representation redistribute the capital of the company in
one or more individuals or legal entities. The monitoring
power derived from the ownership structure results in a
kind of control exercised over the company and, particu-
larly, over the top management team.
Previous studies mainly focus on the effect of insider
ownership on the EM (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca
2007; Teshima and Shuto 2008), along with ownership
concentration (measured by the fraction of ownership held
by major shareholders or by the proportion of ownership held
by the main shareholders of the firm) (De Miguel et al. 2004;
Boubraki et al. 2005). However, Demsetz and Villalonga
(2001) affirm that in order to treat ownership structure
appropriately and to account for the complexity of interest
represented in a given ownership structure, different
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dimensions of ownership structure must be considered.
Following this suggestion, we analyze apart from these two
common dimensions examined by previous literature, two
different dimensions of ownership structure that the litera-
ture has also shown could be an effective CG mechanism in
monitoring management decisions, able to constrict manip-
ulative practices and, consequently, improve earnings qual-
ity: family ownership (Wang 2006; Ali et al. 2007; Bona
et al. 2008) and institutional ownership (Ferreira and Matos
2008; Ruiz et al. 2009; Ferreira et al. 2010). The next sections
describe the development of the hypotheses related to the
four ownership structure variables examined in our study.
Internal Ownership
Agency Theory suggests that when managers are not
owners of the entity that they lead or they have a low
equity stake in it, their behavior is affected by self-interest
that is far from goals of maximizing corporate value and,
therefore, from the interest of shareholders, and this facil-
itates EM (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama
and Jensen 1983; Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995). In
contrast, if managers have a certain proportion of their
wealth materialized in shares of the company that they
lead, or their personal wealth directly depends on the
decisions taken will tend to align, to a greater extent, their
interests with other shareholders (convergence of interests’
hypothesis) and show less discretionary behavior (Mehran
1995; Alonso and De Andre´s 2002). Thus, insider owner-
ship can be seen as a way to constrain the opportunistic
behavior of managers, so the level of discretionary accruals
is predicted to be negatively associated to insider owner-
ship (Wartfield et al. 1995). However, excessive internal
ownership may also have an adverse effect on the com-
pany, because the higher power of the managers could lead
them to take accounting decisions that reflect personal
reasons, so affecting the goal of maximizing the value of
the company (Yermack 1997; Aboody and Kaznik 2000).
Machuga and Teitel (2009) analyze earnings quality sur-
rounding the implementation of Code of Best Corporate
Practices for a sample of Mexican listed companies, and
find that firms with internal ownership show a greater
earnings quality compared to those that do not have man-
agerial ownership.
Therefore, the argument that insider ownership con-
strains the opportunistic interest of managers suggests a
negative relation between the proportion of shares held by
insiders and the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
We address this view by testing the following hypothesis:
H1 Insider shareholding negatively affects earnings man-
agement.
Ownership Concentration
Large shareholders play a key role in internal control of
companies, because the volume of participation encourages
them to monitor and influence the strategy of the firm in
which they have invested (Fernandez 1998; Yeo et al.
2002; Gabrielsen et al. 2002). This means that a greater
ownership concentration should, according to the efficient
monitoring hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling 1976), lead to
a less opportunistic behavior and a greater tendency to
maximization the value of the firm (Fama 1980; Fama and
Jensen 1983), having a positive impact on the informa-
tiveness of accounting earnings, since increasing the par-
ticipation of the controlling shareholder reduces the
incentives of this owner to expropriate the wealth of
minority shareholders (De Miguel et al. 2004; Boubraki
et al. 2005). In this sense, De Bos and Donker (2004) point
out that increased ownership is an effective CG mechanism
in monitoring accounting decisions taken by management
and implies a higher earnings quality.
Yeo et al. (2002) deal with the monitoring role played by
external unrelated block holders, which reduces the oppor-
tunities of earnings management, and de Bos and Donker
(2004) also show that increased ownership concentration is
an effective corporate governance mechanism in monitoring
accounting decisions of incumbent management, such as
voluntary accounting changes. However, when the level of
ownership concentration is too high it can lead to agency
problems due to the expropriation of the minority share-
holders’ interests (Boubraki et al. 2005; Lefort 2007). In this
paper we support the efficient monitoring hypothesis and
suggest a negative association between ownership concen-
tration and earnings management:
H2 Ownership concentration negatively affects
earnings management.
Family Ownership
Several studies have shown how certain distinctive char-
acteristics of family firms have a positive impact on cor-
porate behavior. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that
the long-term ties typical of the family owner mean that
external agents, such as suppliers or lenders, develop their
business with the controlling family over a long period of
time. This leads to these external agents perceiving a
‘‘family reputation’’ that has economic consequences that
last not only for the owners’ lifetime, but throughout the
lives of his/her heirs. In the same line, Wang (2006) and
Ali et al. (2007) states that long-term orientation and rep-
utation concerns means that family firms do not act
opportunistically in reporting earnings, such that their
actions are more in line with a short-term orientation.
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At this point, it could be concluded that, compared with
non-family firms, controlling family firms would tend to
maximize the firm’s wealth in the long term. Thus, there
would be fewer incentives to obtain private benefits at the
expense of minority shareholders, which in turn could
result in a higher earnings quality (Bona et al. 2008).
However, Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) also point out
that one of the main limitations of their studies is the dif-
ficulty in extending their results to other settings where
there is a lower protection of minority shareholders, and
consequently, more concentrated ownership structures,
such as Latin America. This is because the presence of
concentrated ownership structures and the presence of
family groups may trigger other problems of CG. In this
sense, when there are large shareholders in firms there is
more likelihood of conflicts arising from interests between
these parties and the minority shareholders. In family firms,
given their greater information asymmetries, the likelihood
of expropriation of corporate resources is high, including
the likelihood of entrenchment of an unskilled family
management team (Mcvey and Draho 2005; Sacristan and
Gomez 2007).
According to this argument, Castrillo and San Martı´n
(2007) study the relation between ownership structure and
the Board of Directors with managerial discretion for a
sample of Mexican companies, and find that family own-
ership and the level of corporate leverage explain the
degree of discretion that managers have for manipulating
accounting numbers in Mexico. Other studies on the Latin
American context, such as Castan˜eda (2000a, b) and
Rabelo and Coutinho (2001) show that a high family par-
ticipation exerts a decisive influence on the control of
companies, where the owners are usually issued non-voting
shares and develop pyramidal ownership structures to
obtain funds without dispersing their capacity to control the
companies. According to previous arguments, it could be
argued that the greater concentration of voting rights could
entail greater incentives for controlling shareholders to
obtain private benefits, i.e., increasing EM (Bona et al.
2008).
Therefore, the argument that high levels of family own-
ership can lead to agency problems due to the expropriation
of the minority shareholders’ interests in Latin America,
suggests a positive influence on earnings management:
H3 Family ownership positively affects earnings man-
agement.
Institutional Ownership
Institutional investors plays an active role in controlling
managerial discretion and improving the efficiency of
information in capital markets, as the investors are
sophisticated with advantages in acquiring and processing
information (Balsam et al. 2003; Koh 2003; Ferreira and
Matos 2008; Ruiz et al. 2009; Ferreira et al. 2010), so
limiting opportunism and promoting the reduction of
agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Rajgopal et al.
2002; Chung et al. 2002). In this way, Koh (2003) and Hsu
and Koh (2005) propose that the role of institutional
investors in firms can be approximated by considering the
level of participation of the institutional shareholders in
them, i.e., that institutional ownership may act as a gov-
ernance mechanism that affects the EM based on the level
of their participation. Specifically, low levels of investor
participation are assimilated to temporary or short-term
views, whereas when the level of participation increases,
the institutional investor is assimilated to an investor more
engaged with the company, and hence, involved in the
resolution of conflicts that may arise therein.
In Latin America, Lefort (2005) points out that institu-
tional investors have an important role in CG of compa-
nies. The early reform of the pension funds in Chile,
followed later by Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico,
gave institutional investors an important role as providers
of capital and prompted several changes to the laws of
capital markets in the region; it helped to substantially
improve the protection of minority shareholders (Iglesias
2000), given the nature of funds administered and their
political influence.
Therefore, the argument that a higher institutional
ownership should lead to a positive impact on corporate
behavior, because the managers would be discouraged to
make EM due to the pressure from institutional investors to
focus in long term, suggests a negative relation between the
proportion of shares held by institutional owners in Latin
America and the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
H4 Institutional investors negatively affect earnings man-
agement.
Board of Directors
The Board of Directors is the governance body to which
shareholders delegate the responsibility of overseeing,
compensating and substituting managers, as well as
approving major strategic projects. It therefore plays a key
role in the overall overseeing of the company and the
monitoring of top management in particular (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; John and Senbet 1998; Daily et al. 2003;
Chatterjee et al. 2003). Thus, the Board of Directors is an
essential element of CG and is considered the main internal
mechanism in reducing agency conflicts, either between
managers and shareholders or between majority and
minority shareholders (LaFond and Roychowdhury 2006;
De Andrade et al. 2009).
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The CG literature shows different characteristics that
may influence the effectiveness with which the Boards
monitor the performance of managers in firms (John and
Senbet 1998; Rahman and Ali 2006). However, according
to Fernandez et al. (1997), most of the previous CG liter-
ature discusses mainly two characteristics or variables that
influence the monitoring capabilities of Boards: their
independence and size. As well as these two characteris-
tics, we analyze its activity and the CEO duality or con-
centration of power. The next sections describe the
development of the hypotheses related to the four Board
characteristics examined in our study.
Board Size
Studies such as Davila and Watkins (2009) in Mexico and
Ferraz et al. (2011) in Brazil, find that if the size of the
Board is very small, the monitoring of the management
team is smaller too, so they tend towards greater discretion
in receiving higher remuneration, a greater chance of EM
and are more prone to information asymmetry (Fernandez
1998; Azofra et al. 2005; Brick et al. 2006). Thus, a larger
size of Board assumes a better supervision of the man-
agement team and a higher quality of corporate decisions
(Pearce and Zahra 1992). In this sense, Chin et al. (2006)
for a sample of 313 firms from Hong Kong, found a neg-
ative relation between the size of the Board and EM,
concluding that a larger Board fewer are the manipulative
practices made by the management of companies.
However, excessive size can be an obstacle for quick
and efficient decision-making, due to problems of coordi-
nation and communication. Santiago and Brown (2009)
take a sample of 97 companies in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
and find a positive relation between the size of the Board
and EM. This indicates that the low separation between
ownership and control that exists in Latin American com-
panies assumes that with a larger size of Board the levels of
monitoring of the management team decrease, so increas-
ing the risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders
and the propensity to the discretion of the board members
to establish a higher level of remuneration and manipulate
the results of companies for their own benefit (Fernandez
et al. 1997; Core et al. 1999; Thomsen 2008). We support
this last view and pose the following hypothesis:
H5 Board Size positively affects earnings management.
Board Independence
Because previous CG literature shows that independence is
often considered as a substitute for transparency and dis-
closure of annual reports, it has often recommended that
the number of external members in board of directors be
greater than the owners, for there to be more oversight of
management and to maximize the value of the organization
(Zattoni and Cuomo 2010; Ferraz et al. 2011). This sug-
gests that the degree of Board independence is directly
related to the quality of information that firms issues
(Cheng and Courtenay 2006). Also, CG literature has
affirmed that a greater degree of Board independence
provides more control over the development of company
activities and a better defence of the issue of information as
a mechanism to carry out processes of accountability to
different groups of business interest, because the external
directors are not linked to the management of the entity
(Willekens et al. 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005;
Cheng and Courtenay 2006). Therefore, Board indepen-
dence seeks fairness in the strategic decisions taken by the
Board and effective monitoring of the decisions and
activities of managers, thus ensuring transparency of
information and proper image on the outside of organiza-
tions (Chen and Jaggi 2000; Patelli and Prencipe 2007).
Furthermore, several studies provide empirical evidence
relating to the role of external directors on the constriction
of EM, documenting that a higher proportion of external
directors, will mean greater and better quality of financial
information issued by firms, so reducing the chances of EM
(Xie et al. 2003; Davidson et al. 2005; Garcı´a Osma and
Gill de Albornoz 2007; Bradbury et al. 2006; Jaggi et al.
2009).
Most recent studies such as Price et al. (2006, 2007),
Teitel and Machuga (2008), Chong et al. (2009), Davila
and Watkins (2009), and Ferraz et al. (2011) show that a
legal framework in capital markets (such a Code of Best
Corporate Practices) has forced Latin American firms to
include more external directors, so making it possible to
improve the way that firms disclose their financial infor-
mation, and they therefore show a greater transparency in
their reports and decrease the chances of EM. From the
above, we formulate the following hypothesis in the sense
that a possible negative association could be expected
between the degree of Board independence and EM.
H6 The Boards independence affects negatively on earn-
ings management.
Board Activity
Another characteristic related to the Board of Directors is
its activity, measured by the number of meetings, since its
size and independence are necessary but not sufficient.
Thus, Adams (2003) and Garcia Lara et al. (2009) suggest
that the number of meetings is a good proxy for the
directors’ monitoring effort. As Menon and Williams
(1994) notes that Boards that do not meet, or meet only a
few times, are unlikely to be effective monitors. In this
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way, Eguidazu (1999) argues that it is also essential that
the Boards be active and understand their task as a con-
tinuous process, and Vafeas (1999) has demonstrated
empirically the existence of a direct relation between the
Board activity and the profitability of the firm. In conse-
quence, it is possible that Boards that are more engaged in
their duties take a more active stance in order to safeguard
the quality of accounting information, so, in principle, a
negative relation between the Board’s activity and EM is to
be expected (Monterrey and Sa´nchez 2008). An opposing
view is that Board meetings are not necessarily useful
because routine tasks absorb much of the limited time that
directors and CEO’s spend together to set the agenda for
Board meetings (Lorca et al. 2011). Based on the above,
we formulate the following hypothesis in the sense that a
negative association between the Boards activity and EM
could be expected.
H7 A greater number of Board meetings influences
earnings management negatively.
CEO Duality
It is understood that there is concentration of power in a
company when the same person takes the role of chief
executive and president of the Board. Some empirical
studies developed in Latin America show that in practice
this separation is not fulfilled, despite the recommendations
of the Codes of Good Governance. There is a high con-
centration of ownership and control held by families that
produces an effect of entrenchment by the chairman of
Board of Directors when he maintains family ties with the
major shareholders. In this sense, in Mexico, Castan˜eda
(2000b) found that in 85 % of Mexican companies listed
on the Stock Exchange in New York the majority owners
preside the Board of Directors and also exert the role of
CEO. However, Husted and Serrano (2002) argues that
while in Mexican firms, the family retained both functions,
a group of them showed that the majority owner delegated
the role of general manager to a family member, which
responds to succession process and the need to provide a
resource management for the business trust (Hoshino 2004;
Ruiz-Porras and Steinwascher 2007).
Also, Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2005) in Brazil,
through the application of surveys on a sample of 400 listed
companies, documented that 36 % of companies have
power concentrated in the same person. In Argentina,
Chisari and Ferro (2009) for a sample of 100 listed firms,
find that in 75 % of the corporations the chairman and CEO
are the same person. This situation is not very different in
Chile; Lefort and Walker (2005) obtain similar results in a
sample of 120 listed companies, pointing out that only in
21 % of corporations is the Chairman of the Board
independent, that is, there is no duplication of functions
between President-CEO, a situation that is widespread
throughout Latin America. Based on the above, we for-
mulate the following hypothesis in the sense that a positive
association between CEO duality and EM could be
expected.
H8 The existence of concentration of power (CEO
duality) increases earnings management.
Government Index
While corruption is prevalent in emerging countries, there
is increasing focus on the degree of its predictability to
affect the effective functioning of governments and econ-
omies (Gill and Kharas 2007; Aidt 2009). Voliotis (2011)
look at different forms of organisational corruption in the
European Union; Galang’s (2011) study reviews the cor-
ruption literature in leading management journals while
Dela Rama (2011) looks at how the CG of family-owned
business groups, deals with different forms of corruption in
Asia. However, literature regarding ethical aspects on Latin
American countries is scarce and the effects on discretional
behavior have not been tested yet.
Thus, we use the Government Index (GOV_Index) taken
from the research project ‘‘Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors’’ (WGI)1 proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) and
published by the world Bank2 between the periods
2006–2009. We integrate this index using three main indi-
cators that previous literature has shown as very important
factors in measuring the way in which the governability of a
country helps to reduce or increase opportunistic behavior in
firms: control of corruption, rule of law, and government
effectiveness (Aidt 2009; Voliotis 2011; Galang 2011). Low
levels of governability (a low index value) imply, generally,
behaviors that affect the trust placed in public officials and,
therefore, undermine the basis of government trust (Shleifer
and Vishny 1993). The presence of corruption, the lack of
confidence, and respect of the agents in the quality of con-
tract enforcement, property rights, courts, as well as the
ineffectiveness of governments in the implementation and
formulation of policies, increase the risks of the entrepre-
neur, because people from outside the value chain may have
opportunistic behavior and take advantage of their profits, a
1 This indicator reflects the traditions and institutions over which the
authority in a country is exercised, including the process by which
governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the government’s
ability to formulate and implement effective policies, and respect of
citizens and the status of the institutions that govern their economic
and social interactions. The governance indicators cover 213 coun-
tries and are based on 33 sources that include a collection of more
than 120,000 responses from citizens, experts, and companies from
around the world (Kaufmann et al. 2010).
2 Available at www.worldbank.org.
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situation that is feasible due to the relatively high levels of
asymmetry information that characterize the economic
activity (Anokhin and Schulze 2008). In addition, corrup-
tion, inefficiency of governments and a weak rule of law as
well as other weaknesses in the country infrastructure,
increase transaction and agency costs, thus limiting the
income of the firms (Manzetti and Wilson 2007) and, in
consequence, increase the opportunistic behavior of firms.
By contrast, control of corruption, a strong rule of law and an
effectiveness of government (a high index value) increase
the chance of entrepreneurs capturing a larger portion of the
revenues that they generate by increasing the reliability of
cash flows (Rose-Ackerman 2001) and, consequently, they
reduce the opportunistic behavior in firms. Furthermore, in
recent years Latin American countries have made reforms to
their legal frameworks, modifying laws and establishing
harsher punishments for those persons who demonstrate
corruption practices. Based on the above, we formulate the
following hypothesis in the sense that a negative association
between the government index and EM could be expected.
H9 A country with higher levels of governability shows a
lower level on earnings management practices.
Design and Research Methodology
Sample and Data
Our sample comprises firms listed on main Latin American
stock markets, specifically, in the markets of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, during the period 2006–2009.
We select these countries for their relevance in the Latin
America Economy and discard Colombia due to the
insufficient number of available observations. The sample
is obtained from companies listed on the Mexican Stock
Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores), Santiago Stock
Exchange (Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago), Stock Market
of Buenos Aires (Mercado de Valores de Buenos Aires),
and the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de
Sao Paulo) during the period 2006–2009. Financial insti-
tutions are excluded, as is common in this type of studies
because of their particular accounting practices. The
accounting data on financial statements was obtained from
Economatica database, while data on CG and ownership
structure come directly from annual reports submitted by
companies to the different regulatory agencies,3 which are
available on their websites. We obtained information for
435 firms and a total of 1,740 observations for the period
from 2006 to 2009. The composition of the sample allows
the combination of time series and cross sections with
adequate opportunity to take advantage of the creation of a
panel data, especially in the control of unobserved heter-
ogeneity, i.e., the individual characteristics of each entity
that are not observable but affect the variables under study
(Arellano and Bover 1991; Arellano 1993; Himmelberg
et al. 1999; Palia 2001; Brick et al. 2005). Additionally,
since at present the idea of using unbalanced panels with
total observations is widely accepted, the option of ana-
lyzing balanced panels with fewer companies is discarded
because it may be conditioned by the survival bias (Baltagi
and Chang 1994).
Measurement of Abnormal Accruals
We define earnings management in terms of ‘absence of
manipulative practices’. This is because the intentional
manipulation of earnings by managers may reduce the use-
fulness of earnings to the overall users (Velury and Jenkins
2006; Matis et al. 2010). Earnings that are persistence and
predictable may not be of high quality if this results from
earnings management (Dechow and Schrand 2004). We use
the modified version of Jones (1991) proposed by Dechow
et al. (1995) which has been used in other studies such as
Teoh et al. (1998) and Xie et al. (2003) to determine the
discretional accruals. Following Dechow et al. (1995), we
compute the accrual component of earnings as:
Total Accrualsit ¼ ðDCAit  DCashitÞ  ðDCLit
 DSTDitÞ  Depit ð1Þ
where DCAit = change in total current assets; DCashit =
change in cash and cash equivalents; DCLit = change in
total current liabilities; DSTDit = change in long-term debt
included in current liabilities; Depit = depreciation and
amortization expenses. We use the cross-sectional version
of the modified Jones (1991) model to estimate the non-
discretionary component of total accruals (TAC) (DeFond
and Jiambalvo 1991; Yeo et al. 2002).
TACit
Ai;t1







For each year and industry we regress total accruals
(TAC) on the change in revenues (DREV) and the level of
gross property, plant and equipment (PPE), scaled by
lagged total assets (At-1) in order to avoid problems of
heteroskedasticity. Using the estimates for the regression
parameters, (b^0; b^1; b^2), we estimate each sample firm’s
non-discretionary accruals (NDCA) by adjusting the
change in sales for the change in accounts receivable
(DAR) to allow for the possibility that firms could have
manipulated sales by changing credit terms (Dechow et al.
1995).
3 For Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina the annual reports are
available at www.bmv.com.mx; www.bmfbovespa.com.br; www.
bolsadesantiago.com; www.cnv.gov.ar.
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And we define discretionary accruals (DCAit) for firm




Thus, we use the absolute value of discretionary
accruals [Abs(DCA)it] as a measure of the degree of EM.
This is consistent with previous studies on earnings
management which point out that the study of the quality
of results does not impose any direction or sign on the
expectations of EM (Wartfield et al. 1995; Gabrielsen et al.
2002; Wang 2006; Chen et al. 2007; Barth et al. 2008).
Models and Variables Definition
Since the aim is to investigate the influence that CG
mechanisms have on EM, measured by discretionary
accruals, we regress the absolute value of discretionary
accruals [Abs(DCA)it] on the variables of ownership
structure, Board of Directors and control used in previous
literature, according to the following model:
Abs DACð Þit ¼ b0 þ b1 Int OWNð Þ þ b2 OWN Conð Þ
þ b3 Fam OWNð Þ þ b4 Inst OWNð Þ
þ b5 Board SIZEð Þ þ b6 Board INDð Þ
þ b7 Board ACTð Þ þ b8 CEO Dualð Þ
þ b9 GOV Indexð Þ þ b10 Controlð Þ þ gi
þ kt þ tit
The unobserved heterogeneity is controlled in the two
models through individual effects of companies (gi). Also,
we included dummy variables to control the temporal
effects (kit) and the error term (tit). As a proxy for internal
property (Int_OWN) we use the proportion of shares C1 %
owned by members of Board of Directors and managers of
the firms; the ownership concentration (OWN_Con) is
measured by the proportion of shares owned by the major
shareholder of the company, because many firms in Latin
America are directly controlled by one of the industrial or
financial conglomerates that operate in the region (Lopez
and Saona 2005; Cespedes et al. 2008); family ownership
(Fam_OWN) is measured by the proportion of shares held
by family members, i.e., the percentage of capital that is
directly or indirectly in their hands C5 % and; institutional
ownership (Inst_OWN) through the proportion of shares
held by institutional investors. Board size (Board_SIZE) is
measured by the total number of directors that integrate the
Board of Directors; Board independence (Board_IND) is
measured by the proportion of external directors inside the
Board (external directors/total directors) and with a dummy
variable (Board_IND50) that takes the value of one when
the Board comprises a majority of external directors; Board
activity (Board_ACT) is measured by the number of
meetings held during the year; President–CEO duality
(CEO_Dual) is measured through a dummy variable that
considers the value of 1 if there is duality of roles between
the chairman and CEO of the firm and, 0 otherwise.
Finally, there is the government Index (Gov_Index), which
measures the governability level of the country (control of
corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness).
We also control the effect of various factors through the
inclusion of variables which have been used in previous
studies and have been associated with EM and CG. Thus,
we include the variable quality and reputation of the
external auditor (Big_4) measured by a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the company is audited by one of
the big four audit firms, 0 otherwise. Several studies thus
indicate that quality of accounting information will be
linked to the prestige and quality of the external auditor
(Lennox 1999; Jara and Lo´pez 2007), because more repu-
table auditors limit the possibility of EM and therefore, the
financial statements audited by these firms have greater
credibility (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Teoh et al.
1998).
Another control variable is firm size (Log_ASSET)
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at the end
of year (Sanchez and Sierra 2001), controlling with it the
effects of company size on accounting choice. Authors
generally expect, and often prove, a negative relation
between firm size and EM, given that larger companies are
expected to have more sophisticated control systems,
skilled advisers, more negotiating power with the external
auditor and are subject to increased monitoring by inves-
tors and analysts, so accounting fraud is less probable than
in smaller firms, where the managers of these companies
have more opportunities to manipulate the information
(Goodwin and Kent 2006; Prior et al. 2008). We also
include the indebtedness level variable (Debt), calculated
as the ratio of total debt and total assets. Thus, a high
indebtedness is associated with the risk of excessive
leverage (Press and Weintrop 1990), which motivates the
EM to conceal inconvenient information and display a
greater capacity to generate resources (Dechow et al. 1995;
Krishnan et al. 1996; Balsam et al. 2003).
Additionally, following Francis and Wang (2004) we
include two control variables on firm performance. The
first is the growth variable (GROWTH), measured in terms
of the relation of the difference in sales and sales of the
previous period for firm i in year t, which indicates that
companies with high growth rates are more likely to use
discretionary accruals (McNichols 2000). The second is the
variable (ROA), calculated by the ratio between earnings
before extraordinaire, interest and taxes of year t and the
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total net assets at beginning of year t, and positively related
to the use of discretionary accruals. This suggests that
managers are motivated to manipulate the results upward,
i.e., increase the profits obtained with the intention of
making the company more attractive (Kothari et al. 2005;
Machuga and Teitel 2007).
Also, because a poor financial situation of the company
could increase agency costs and encourage the manage-
ment to manipulate the accounting numbers (Nurul et al.
2010) we include the control variable loss (Loss) which is
measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if
the company has had losses in the last 2 years and, 0
otherwise. Finally, we consider the sector of activity vari-
ables (IND) and year (YEAR), which are important factors
of measurement because sectors and specific years could




Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and t values of
discretionary accruals for estimated [Abs(DCA)it], showing
that mean values of discretionary accruals are, in all cases,
statistically different from zero. This does not allow us to
reject the null hypothesis and, therefore, provides evidence
that Latin American companies manipulate their results,
either by increasing profits to denote a better and higher
profitability of the company or, on the contrary, reducing
them as fiscal strategy aims to pay fewer taxes and
contributions.
Table 2 shows the mean, median, standard deviation and
the associated t value of the estimated coefficients of the
absolute value of discretionary accruals [Abs(DCA)it] per
country. It can be seen that the model significantly explains
variations in the coefficients of discretionary accruals, as its
explanatory power shows Adjusted R2 values (significance
level) above 40 % for all the countries.
Table 3 shows the main descriptive statistics of quan-
titative and dichotomous variables. Thus, with respect the
Board characteristics variables it can be seen that in the
four countries analyzed, generally, companies Boards
meets on average 5 times a year. It can also be seen that
Boards are composed of a mean of 11 members, of whom
38.5 % are external directors, a fact that clearly indicates
that the composition of this organ of government is a
majority of internal members, thus demonstrating control
and dominion among those that have families on this
governing body.
Regarding ownership structure, Table 3 shows that
Mexican companies have highest family engagement, with
37.1 %, followed by Argentinian (35 %), Chilean (26.2 %),
and Brazilian (24 %) companies. The ownership concen-
tration (major shareholder) reflects an average of 29.4 % of
the social capital of firms. Hence, Chilean companies are
those that revealed have a higher shareholding concentra-
tion with 32.2 %, followed by Brazilian (29.3 %), Mexican
(28.6 %), and Argentinean (27.5 %) firms. Moreover,
regarding the internal ownership (top management), it can
be seen that manager and directors holds, on average, 6.1 %
of the social capital of companies. Thus, Brazilian firms are
those that revealed have a higher internal ownership with
7.3 %, followed by Argentinean (7.1 %), Chilean (6 %),
and Mexican (4.5 %) companies. Finally, the institutional
ownership indicates an average value of 22.8 % of social
capital held by institutional investors. Thus, Brazilian
companies are those that have revealed a higher participa-
tion of institutional investors with 23.9 %, followed by the
Chilean (23.8 %), Argentinean (21 %), and Mexican
(20.6 %) firms.
Regression Results
After analyzing the variables descriptively, it is necessary
to apply tests to help measure the linear relation between
the dependent variable ‘‘absolute value of discretionary
accruals [Abs(DCA)it]’’ and the independent and control
variables of the firms. The explanatory development is
based mainly on determining the level of influence that CG
mechanisms has on discretionary accruals. In order to
determine which model is best suited to our data, (the fixed
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals [Abs(DCA)it]
estimations by year
Years N Mean Median SD T Adjusted
R2
DAC-2006 435 0.224 0.119 0.441 0.619 0.536
DAC-2007 435 0.278 0.112 0.704 -1.070 0.285
DAC-2008 435 0.198 0.122 0.293 1.567 0.118
DAC-2009 435 0.249 0.142 0.420 -0.243 0.808
Global 1,740 0.237 0.121 0.489 1.459 0.447
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals [Abs(DCA)it]
estimations by country
Country N Mean Median SD T Adjusted R2
Argentina 308 0.247 0.137 0.425 0.412 0.744
Brazil 480 0.293 0.152 0.481 1.749 0.476
Chile 532 0.236 0.101 0.651 1.852 0.542
Mexico 420 0.167 0.110 0.198 1.493 0.408
Global 1,740 0.237 0.121 0.489 1.459 0.447
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of quantitative and dichotomous variables observations by country
Variable Statistics Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Global
N 308 480 532 420 1,740
Quantitative variables
Int_OWN Mean 0.071 0.073 0.060 0.045 0.061
Std. Dev. 0.046 0.048 0.047 0.038 0.046
OWN_Con Mean 0.275 0.293 0.322 0.286 0.294
Std. Dev. 0.106 0.102 0.118 0.101 0.107
Fam_OWN Mean 0.350 0.240 0.262 0.371 0.305
Std. Dev. 0.163 0.177 0.181 0.181 0.179
Inst_OWN Mean 0.210 0.239 0.238 0.206 0.228
Std. Dev. 0.145 0.136 0.135 0.135 0.137
Board_SIZE Mean 11.49 11.38 11.54 11.47 11.47
Std. Dev. 3.82 3.69 3.60 3.66 3.67
Board_IND Mean 0.400 0.394 0.366 0.375 0.385
Std. Dev. 0.730 0.891 0.077 0.862 0.083
Board_ACT Mean 5.42 5.37 5.33 5.15 5.31
Std. Dev. 2.49 2.50 2.47 2.38 2.46
GOV_Index Mean 41.13 51.12 88.05 48.78 49.73
Std. Dev. 3.25 2.51 0.68 2.06 18.78
Log_ASSET Mean 13.32 13.39 18.39 16.09 15.58
Std. Dev. 1.91 1.75 2.32 1.70 2.93
Debt Mean 0.396 0.504 0.280 0.227 0.350
Std. Dev. 1.371 0.691 0.924 0.158 0.862
ROA Mean 4.47 4.58 9.18 6.96 6.56
Std. Dev. 1.84 1.67 2.36 1.70 2.79
GROWTH Mean 0.236 0.531 0.103 0.124 0.249
Std. Dev. 0.617 2.221 0.299 0.484 1.241
Dichotomous variables
Board_IND50 0 148 (48.1 %) 240 (50.0 %) 316 (59.4 %) 224 (53.3 %) 928 (53.3 %)
1 160 (51.9 %) 240 (50.0 %) 216 (40.6 %) 196 (46.7 %) 812 (46.7 %)
CEO_Dual 0 99 (32.1 %) 193 (40.2 %) 209 (39.3 %) 172 (40.9 %) 673 (38.7 %)
1 209 (67.9 %) 287 (59.8 %) 323 (60.7 %) 248 (59.1 %) 1,067 (61.3 %)
Big_4 0 144 (46.8 %) 199 (41.5 %) 180 (33.8 %) 120 (28.6 %) 643 (36.9 %)
1 164 (53.2 %) 281 (58.5 %) 352 (66.2 %) 300 (71.4 %) 1,097 (63.1 %)
Loss 0 234 (76.0 %) 373 (77.7 %) 436 (81.9 %) 319 (75.9 %) 1,362 (78.3 %)
1 74 (24.0 %) 107 (22.3 %) 96 (18.1 %) 101 (24.1 %) 378 (21.7 %)
Quantitative variables: Int_OWN Internal ownership, measured by the proportion of shares owned by managers and members of Boards (C1 %);
OWN_Con Ownership Concentration, measured by the ratio of shares held by the major shareholder of the company (C5 %); Fam_OWN Family
Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares held by family members (C5 %), as a percentage of capital that is directly or indirectly in his
possession; Inst_OWN Institutional Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares held by institutional investors; Board_SIZE Size of boards
of directors, measured by the total number of members of Boards; Board_IND independence of the Board, measured by the proportion of
independent members (independent directors/total directors); Board_ACT Activity of Boards, measured by the number of meetings; GOV_Index
The degree of law enforcement of each country analyzed, taken from the research project ‘‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’’ (WGI) proposed
by Kaufmann et al. (2010); Log_ASSET Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets of the companies; Debt Level of
indebtedness, measured by the quotient resulting from gross debt to total assets; ROA Economic Return, measured by the ratio of the relationship
between the result before special items, interest and taxes of year t and the total net assets at the beginning of year t; GROWTH Growth of the
Companies, calculated in terms of the ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the previous period of firm i in year t
Dichotomous variables: Boad_IND50 Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if boards has a majority of independent directors
and, 0 otherwise; CEO_Dual Measured through a dummy variable that considers the value of 1 if there is duality of roles between the chairman
and CEO of the companies and, 0 otherwise; Big_4 Measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firms are audited by one of the big
four firms, 0 otherwise; Loss Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the companies have had losses in the last 2 years and, 0
otherwise
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effects based on groups estimator or random effects based
on generalized least squares (GLS)), we perform the
Hausman test (1978), which determines whether the dif-
ferences are systematic and significant between the two
models. In all cases, the result of this test does not reject
the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between
the regressors’ and unobserved heterogeneity, therefore
assuming the random effects as the most appropriate for
our analysis.
Thus, in Table 4 the model 10 shows the results obtained
from the linear regression of the panel data, the absolute
value of discretionary accruals [Abs(DCA)it] on the vari-
ables of ownership structure, Board of Directors and control.
With regard to the internal ownership, is observed that the
stake held by managers and directors in Latin American
firms have a significant negative relation at level of 1 % with
the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The findings
show a significant negative relation at level of 1 % with
ownership concentration and board size (5 %).
In addition, the model 10 shows that Board activity has a
negative relation, significant at level of 5 %, showing that
the greater number of meetings held by the Boards
decreases the use of discretionary accruals. We do not find
any statistically significant relation between family own-
ership (Fam_OWN), institutional ownership (Inst_OWN),
CEO duality (CEO_Dual), and the absolute value of dis-
cretional accruals.
On the other hand, there is a significant negative relation
at the 1 % level between Government Index (GOV_Index)
and discretionary accruals. Finally, in the remaining con-
trol variables it can be seen that they maintain their level of
significance and the expected sign: there is a significant
negative relation at the 5 % level between firm size and
discretionary accruals and a significant positive relation at
the 1 % level between discretionary accruals and level of
debt, economic profitability and growth.
Additionally, in model 11 of Table 4 we use a different
proxy for Board independence, replacing the proportion of
external directors on Boards (Board_IND) by a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if Board has a majority of
external directors, and 0 otherwise (Board_IND50). The
conclusions are the same as model 10, i.e., the Board
independence also shows a weak negative relation signifi-




In this section we extend the previous analyzes to test the
possible nonlinear relations between CG mechanisms and
EM. As we have shown in the literature review section,
there are competing views about the effect of certain
governance characteristics on earnings management. Thus,
we have re-tested model 10, including the quadratic terms
for insider ownership, ownership concentration and board
activity. With these analyses we will try to explain if a
U-shape relation could explain the ambiguous outcome
regarding these variables.
Thus, since previous studies have found non-linearities
which support both the convergence-of-interests and the
entrenchment hypotheses in different ownership intervals
(Morck et al. 1988; Yeo et al. 2002), we examine the
possible non-linearities in the relation between insider
ownership and discretionary accruals. In Table 5, model
(12), we test the non linear effect of insider ownership
(Int_OWN and Int_OWN2) on earnings management along
with the other governance and control variables. Similarly
in models (13) and (14) we check the non-linearities of
ownership concentration (OWN_Con and OWN_Con2)
and board activity (Board_ACT and Board_ACT2).
In model (15) we report the results when we take into
account the non-linearities in the three variables (Int_OWN,
OWN_Con, Board_ACT). This model shows that the linear
and quadratic terms of the internal ownership are significant
at the 1 and 5 % levels, respectively, with the linear term
negative and the quadratic term positive, suggesting that
when the ownership of the insiders increases it reduces the
EM by managers (Weisbach 1988; Fernandez 1998; Cornett
et al. 2008), but, as we can observe in Table 6, when the
internal ownership reaches a certain point,4 which is around
14.1 %, the situation is reversed with an increase in manip-
ulative practices by insiders.
Additionally, Table 5 shows that for the concentration
of shares held by major shareholders, the linear and qua-
dratic term are significant at the 1 and 5 % levels,
respectively, with the linear term negative and the qua-
dratic positive, indicating that ownership concentration is
also a mechanism that could restrict the manipulative
practices when the proportion of shares held by major
shareholders is not very high (efficient monitoring
hypothesis). Table 7 shows the non-linear relation in detail,
indicating that when ownership concentration reaches a
certain point,5 which is located around 35.1 %, there is an
increase in the use of discretionary accruals.
4 This minimum is calculated by differentiating the dependent
variable with respect to the internal ownership and equating to zero,
and q/qx = 0, thus obtaining the value of internal ownership that
verifies this condition and proving that 2y q/qx [ 0, which implies
that this point is a minimum.
5 This minimum is calculated by differentiating the dependent
variable with respect to the ownership concentration and equating
to zero, and q/qx = 0, thus obtaining the value of the ownership
concentration that verifies this condition and proving that 2y q/qx [ 0,
which implies that this point is a minimum.
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Finally, concerning the Boards activity, in Table 5 the
full model shows that the linear term has a weak negative
significance at level of 10 % and the quadratic term is
positive but not significant, providing an explanation for
the contradictory effect of Board activity.
Robustness Analysis
In order to verify the robustness between models, Table 8
shows the comparison of the results exposed in previous
section with other models also used in literature to measure
the quality of results, like the original version of the Jones
model (1991), the Jones cash flow model used by Jeter and
Shivakumar (1999) and, the KS model proposed by Kang
and Sivaramakrishnan (1995). Thus, it is observed that the
original Jones model, the Jones cash flow model and the
KS model shows qualitatively similar results to those
obtained through the Modified Jones model, so demon-
strating the robustness of the tests.
Discussion
Our study has analyzed the effects of CG over the earnings
management, measured by discretionary accruals, for a set
of non-financial companies listed on Latin American stock
markets, specifically, listed companies in markets of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
In relation to the participation of the management team
on firms’ ownership, our results show a non-linear relation
between insiders ownership and discretionary accruals that
suggests that internal ownership is a mechanism that,
despite differences in CG systems, may restrict the use of
discretionary accruals only when the proportion of shares
owned by the insiders is not very high. Our result is in line
with those obtained by Machuga and Teitel (2009) with a
sample of Mexican firms, who show that firms with less
internal ownership show a greater earnings quality com-
pared to those that do not have managerial ownership, i.e.,
shows less manipulative practices by managers, because of
the implementation of good CG practices contained in
Codes of Best Practices. Likewise, other studies such as
Morck et al. (1988) in Canada, Wartfield et al. (1995) in the
US, Yeo et al. (2002) in Singapore and Sanchez-Ballesta
and Garcia-Meca (2007) in Spain, also point out that the
informativeness of accounting results increases with low
levels of internal ownership, while for a high levels, the
internal ownership is not sufficient as a mechanism of
interest alignment.
Regarding the influence of ownership concentration, the
results confirm hypothesis H2 and suggest that when the
main shareholders have a high percentage of ownership or
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Table 5 Non-linear relation in internal ownership, ownership concentration and board activity
Variables (12) (13) (14) (15)
Int_OWN -0.978*** -0.456** -0.486** -0.873***
(-1.06) (-1.90) (-2.03) (0.94)
Int_OWN2 2.888** 2.401**
(0.55) (0.46)
OWN_Con -2.150** -2.101*** -2.099** -2.126***
(-1.35) (-1.17) (-1.32) (-1.47)
OWN_Con2 1.749** 1.540**
(1.46) (1.54)
Fam_OWN -0.057 -0.063 -0.056 -0.068
(-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.56) (-0.68)
Inst_OWN -0.079 -0.076 -0.078 -0.074
(-0.99) (-0.95) (-0.98) (-0.92)
Board_SIZE 0.053* 0.051* 0.047* 0.044*
(1.20) (1.15) (1.06) (0.99)
Board_IND -3.556* -3.190* -3.534* -3.231*
(-1.81) (-1.62) (-1.80) (-1.64)
Board_ACT -0.124* -0.134* -0.191* -0.134*
(-2.03) (-2.18) (-0.94) (-0.55)
Board_ACT2 0.094 0.231
(0.39) (1.13)
CEO_Dual 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007
(0.20) (0.23) (0.27) (0.31)
GOV_Index -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.154*** -0.159***
(-3.28) (-3.35) (-3.23) (-3.32)
Big_4 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027
(-1.20) (-1.21) (-1.27) (-1.17)
Log_ASSET -0.025** -0.026** -0.024** -0.028**
(-1.38) (-1.47) (-1.37) (-1.49)
Debt 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.315***
(2.37) (2.37) (-2.36) (2.34)
ROA 0.043** 0.044*** 0.044** 0.046***
(2.47) (2.52) (2.49) (2.60)
GROWTH 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(3.26) (3.25) (3.23) (3.21)
Loss 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.21) (0.28) (0.27) (0.33)
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.2772 0.2786 0.2781 0.2792
Number of
Observations
1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740
Model 15: Abs(ADD)it = b0 ? b1(Int_OWN) ? b2(Int_OWN2) ? b3(OWN_Con) ? b4(OWN_Con2) ? b5(Fam_OWN) ? b6(Inst_OWN) ? b7(Board_SIZE) ? b8(Board_
IND) ? b9(Board_ACT) ? b10(Board_ACT2) ? b11(CEO_Dual) ? b12(Big_4) ? b13(Log_ASSET) ? b14(Debt) ? b15(ROA) ? b16(GROWTH) ? -
? bBoardACT ? b1BoardACT ? b11CEODual ? b1Big ? b1LogASSET ? b1Debt ? b1ROA ? b1GROWTH ? b1Loss ? b1GOV
Index ? gi ? kt ? tit
*** Significant at level 1 %, ** significant at level 5 %, * significant at level 10 %
Notes. The model includes industry sectors and time controls, but they are not reported. Z statistics in parentheses
Quantitative variables: Int_OWN Internal ownership, measured by the proportion of shares owned by managers and members of Boards (C1 %); OWN_Con Ownership
Concentration, measured by the ratio of shares held by the major shareholder of the company (C5 %); Fam_OWN Family Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares held
by family members (C5 %), as a percentage of capital that is directly or indirectly in his possession; Inst_OWN Institutional Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares
held by institutional investors; Board_SIZE Size of boards of directors, measured by the total number of members of Boards; Board_IND independence of the Board, measured
by the proportion of independent members (independent directors/total directors); Board_ACT Activity of Boards, measured by the number of meetings; Log_ASSET Firm size,
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets of the companies; Debt Level of indebtedness, measured by the quotient resulting from gross debt to total assets, ROA
Economic Return, measured by the ratio of the relation between the result before special items, interest and taxes of year t and the total net assets at the beginning of year t;
GROWTH Growth of the Companies, calculated in terms of the ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the previous period of firm i in year t; GOV_Index The degree of law
enforcement of each country analyzed, taken from the research project ‘‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’’ (WGI) proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Dichotomous variables: Boad_IND50 Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if boards has a majority of independent directors and, 0 otherwise; CEO_Dual
Measured through a dummy variable that considers the value of 1 if there is duality of roles between the chairman and CEO of the companies and, 0 otherwise; Big_4 Measured
by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firms are audited by one of the big four firms, 0 otherwise; Loss Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the
companies have had losses in the last 2 years and, 0 otherwise
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absolute value of discretionary accruals is reduced, due to
the efficient monitoring hypothesis indicated by Agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and
Jensen 1983). The findings are also consistent with Fer-
nandez et al. (1998), Yeo et al. (2002), Gabrielsen et al.
(2002), and De Bos and Donker (2004), who note the
monitoring role of external block holders, and their strong
positive effects on earnings informativeness. However, the
findings note that ownership concentration is also a
mechanism that could restrict the manipulative practices
when the proportion of shares held by major shareholders
is not very high (efficient monitoring hypothesis). Above
35.1 % concentration, an increase in the use of discre-
tionary accruals is observed, confirming that environments
with high ownership concentration promote the EM.
Therefore, our results confirm that insider ownership
and ownership concentration are mechanisms that, in spite
of the differences in corporate governance, may constrain
discretionary accruals when the proportion of shares held
by insiders or block holders is not too high. Nevertheless,
when insiders and large shareholders own a large per-
centage of outstanding shares, they tend to make discre-
tionary accounting choices.
Our results confirm hypothesis 5 and reveal how the
dimension of Boards creates problems of communication
and coordination that decreases the monitoring of the man-
agement team, thus increasing the EM. Also, our findings
show that board independence has a weak negative relation,
significant only at the 10 %, so we reject hypothesis 6. Our
result contrasts with the prominent role that both the theo-
retical and empirical literature has assigned to this attribute
of the Board to safeguard the quality and transparency of
results but, for the case of Latin American countries ana-
lyzed, it does not seem to be so effective.
In this regard, Price et al. (2006, 2007), Teitel and
Machuga (2008), Chong et al. (2009), and Davila and
Watkins (2009) in Mexico; Silveira et al. (2003), Schiehll
and Santos (2004), and Ferraz et al. (2011) in Brazil;
Iglesias (1999) in Chile; suggest that this is due to
Boards’ being mainly composed of major shareholders
and managers of the companies, with external directors
having a very limited participation, which facilitates the
EM and the managerial discretion. It is probable that this
evidence is derived, as stated by Yermack (2004), from
the presence of grey directors, lack of rotation of the
directors or both.
Grey directors are those that maintain some kind of
family or professional relationship (present or past) with the
company or its top management. The fact that in the annual
reports of CG they are designated as external and almost in
no way disclose any possible conflicts of interest could
severely limit the Board independence. As regards the sec-
ond, its slow or almost non-existent rotation makes them
permanently external, and thus the report of the First Latin
American Corporate Governance Survey, conducted by
Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) in 2010 (published in
2011) indicates that on average only 12.35 % of companies
listed on Latin American stock markets put time limits for
external directors. In short, according to Monterrey and
Sanchez (2008), both groups might fall into the category that
Eguidazu (1999) calls ‘‘the label’’, in which independence is
an appearance and not an attitude, because the absence of
sufficient distance from the management of the company
could, in fact, concentrate power inside the Board, thereby
facilitating EM (Garcı´a Osma and Gill de Albornoz 2007).
Furthermore, concerning Board activity, a higher num-
ber of meetings can mean a greater involvement of Boards
in tasks and monitoring activities and their taking a much
more active position to safeguard the quality of financial
information and, hence, reduce the use of discretionary
accruals, which confirms H7.
Finally, we notice a significant negative relation at the
1 % level between Government Index (GOV_Index) and
discretionary accruals (hypothesis 9), suggesting that when
a country implements controls aimed at reducing corrup-
tion, strengthening the rule of law or improving the
Table 6 Discretionary accruals by ranks of internal ownership
Rank (%) [Abs(DCA)it]
a Rank (%) [Abs(DCA)it]
a
0.0–1.0 0.7283 10.1–11.0 0.1744
1.1–2.0 0.5128 11.1–12.0 0.1696
2.1–3.0 0.3766 12.1–13.0 0.1669
3.1–4.0 0.3302 13.1–14.0 0.1471
4.1–5.0 0.3183 14,1–15.0 0.1879
5.1–6.0 0.2580 15.1–16.0 0.2008
6.1–7.0 0.2251 16.1–17.0 0.2108
7.1–8.0 0.2184 17.1–18.0 0.2370
8.1–9.0 0.2126 18.1–19.0 0.2374
9.1–10.0 0.1975 19.1–20.0 0.2390
a Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones
Modified Model
Table 7 Discretionary accruals by ranks of ownership concentration
Rank (%) [Abs(DCA)it]
a Rank (%) [Abs(DCA)it]
a
10.0–15.0 0.2208 35.1–40.0 0.2213
15.1–20.0 0.2200 40.1–45.0 0.2378
20.1–25.0 0.2143 45.1–50.0 0.2572
25.1–30.0 0.2067 50.1–55.0 0.2827
30.1–35.0 0.1967 55.1–60.0 0.3303
a Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones
Modified Model
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Table 8 Comparison of models of discretionary accruals robustness test
Variables Jones Modified Jones Original Jones Cash Flow KS
Int_OWN -0.481*** -0.451** -0.486** -0.472**
(-2.01) (-2.25) (-2.14) (-2.33)
OWN_Con -2.174*** -2.374* -1.353* -1.883*
(-1.36) (-1.82) (-0.89) (-1.39)
Fam_OWN -0.055 -0.035 -0.069 -0.036
(-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.73) (-0.43)
Inst_OWN -0.080 -0.043 -0.052 -0.029
(-1.00) (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.43)
Board_SIZE 0.053** 0.073* 0.041* 0.055*
(1.19) (1.91) (0.99) (1.47)
Board_IND -3.513* -2.628* -2.419* -2.420*
(-1.79) (-1.47) (-1.30) (-1.46)
Board_ACT -0.127** -0.025** -0.141** -0.027*
(-2.07) (-0.38) (-2.42) (-0.53)
CEO_Dual 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007
(0.21) (0.34) (0.25) (0.38)
GOV_Index -0.156*** -0.066* -0.138*** -0.086*
(-3.27) (-2.13) (-3.04) (-2.12)
Big_4 -0.029 -0.016 -0.025 -0.015
(-1.26) (-0.69) (-1.16) (-0.78)
Log_ASSET -0.024** -0.022* -0.037** -0.031**
(-1.37) (-1.33) (-2.19) (-2.05)
Debt 0.316*** 0.315** 0.266*** 0.270***
(2.37) (2.59) (2.10) (2.39)
ROA 0.043** 0.037** 0.052*** 0.044***
(2.45) (2.21) (3.14) (2.99)
GROWTH 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.019** 0.014*
(3.27) (3.29) (2.24) (1.88)
Loss 0.006 0.012 0.011 0.005
(0.22) (0.49) (0.42) (0.19)
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.2777 0.2255 0.2306 0.2687
Number of Observations 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740
Notes. The model includes industry sectors and time controls, but they are not reported. Z statistics in parentheses
Quantitative variables: Int_OWN Internal ownership, measured by the proportion of shares owned by managers and members of Boards (C1 %);
OWN_Con Ownership Concentration, measured by the ratio of shares held by the major shareholder of the company (C5 %); Fam_OWN Family
Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares held by family members (C5 %), as a percentage of capital that is directly or indirectly in his
possession; Inst_OWN Institutional Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares held by institutional investors; Board_SIZE Size of boards
of directors, measured by the total number of members of Boards; Board_IND independence of the Board, measured by the proportion of
independent members (independent directors/total directors); Board_ACT Activity of Boards, measured by the number of meetings; Log_ASSET
Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets of the companies; Debt Level of indebtedness, measured by the quotient resulting
from gross debt to total assets, ROA Economic Return, measured by the ratio of the relation between the result before special items, interest and
taxes of year t and the total net assets at the beginning of year t; GROWTH Growth of the Companies, calculated in terms of the ratio of the
difference in sales and sales of the previous period of firm i in year t; GOV_Index The degree of law enforcement of each country analyzed, taken
from the research project ‘‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’’ (WGI) proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Dichotomous variables: Boad_IND50 Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if boards has a majority of independent directors
and, 0 otherwise; CEO_Dual Measured through a dummy variable that considers the value of 1 if there is duality of roles between the chairman
and CEO of the companies and, 0 otherwise; Big_4 Measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firms are audited by one of the big
four firms, 0 otherwise; Loss Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the companies have had losses in the last 2 years and, 0
otherwise
*** Significant at level 1 %, ** significant at level 5 %, * significant at level 10 %
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effectiveness of government, this seems to influence EM
negatively, i.e., it shows an increase in the quality and
transparency of the financial information issued by com-
panies, thus showing a reduction of discretionary accruals.
The results are in line with those noted by Labelle et al.
(2010), who point to a higher level of corporate moral
development being associated with higher quality financial
reporting.
Our research contributes to the debate by demonstrating
that, in Latin America, with a corporate governance system
characterized by low investor protection and high ownership
concentration, insider ownership and ownership concentra-
tion affect discretionary accruals. The findings demonstrate
that on average earnings are more likely to be manipulated
when insider ownership and ownership concentration is too
high. Both results are consistent with insiders and large
shareholders possessing information acquisition and infor-
mation processing advantages. This study also has policy
implications by showing that corruption, inefficiency of
governments and a weak rule of law increase opportunistic
behavior in Latin American firms. Our findings also have
important policy implications since they support the opinion
that the full application of the Anglo-Saxon corporate gov-
ernance model is inappropriate (Sanchez-Ballesta and Gar-
cia-Meca 2007) and they contribute to the literature by
extending the research into the effects of corporate gover-
nance on portfolio firm’s earnings management.
Our research design is subject to several limitations. The
most obvious concern is the measurement problems of
earnings management. Nevertheless, the different models
used in the paper (Jones original, Jones modified, Jones
cash flow, and KS model) indicate that the results are
robust after controlling for alternative measures of discre-
tionary accounting accruals. Because our results focus on
four Latin American countries and on one period,
2006–2009, both country and time period are other limi-
tations of the study. Further research might examine if the
relations found in this study can be extended to other Latin
American countries and periods. This could provide
increased robustness of the results. A further refinement of
the variables used (e.g., if in the future regulators forced
companies to disclose whether the independent directors
have any conflict of interest that would alter the degree of
Board independence), or the simple fact of having data that
it is currently difficult to know, such as the nationality of
institutional investors, could lead to a better understanding
of the relation between internal mechanism of CG and EM
in Latin American markets. Despite these limitations, this
study adds to the ethics literature by considering the
ownership structure and board of directors and extends the
line of research on earnings management and corporate
governance.
Concluding Remarks
Being aware of the existence of opportunistic EM activities
evokes a general interest in factors that may constrain these
actions. The main objective was to analyze the relation
between the internal mechanisms of CG and EM in firms
listed on the main Latin American stock markets, specifi-
cally in the markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mex-
ico, during the period 2006–2009. The findings offer new
insights into these relations in an institutional context that
greatly differs from those of the countries considered in
previous literature (particularly the US system).
The findings show that the environment of high ownership
concentration that exists in Latin American companies
negatively affects the quality and transparency of financial
information that is issued to the market, suggesting that
ownership concentration may be a constrictor mechanism of
manipulative practices only when the ownership of the main
shareholders is moderate. Similarly, internal ownership is a
mechanism that, despite differences in CG systems, could
restrict the practices of discretionary accruals only when the
proportion of shares owned by insiders is not very high.
In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon context, the relation
found between the level of earnings manipulation and the
proportion of independent directors is weak, probably due
to the presence of grey directors and the lack of rotation of
directors in Latin American firms.
Furthermore, our results show that when a country imple-
ments controls aimed at behaving ethically, reducing cor-
ruption, strengthen the rule of law or improving the
effectiveness of government, these seem to increase the
quality and transparency of the financial information issued by
firms, so improving ethical behavior of their managers and,
consequently, showing a reduction of discretionary accruals.
As a result, this paper tries to provide valuable input for reg-
ulators who are requesting continuous analytical work to
know the implications of exceptionally poor governance and it
suggests that policy makers should consider the characteristics
of firms as well as the institutional environment before they
implement additional corporate governance reforms.
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Table 9 Correlation matrix
Variables Abs(DAC)it Int_OWN OWN_Con Fam_OWN Inst_OWN Board_SIZE Board_IND Board_ACT
Abs(DAC)it 1.000
Int_OWN -0.069*** 1.000
OWN_Con -0.065*** 0.105*** 1.000
Fam_OWN -0.046* 0.030 -0.092*** 1.000
Inst_OWN -0.042 -0.015 -0.014 0.076*** 1.000
Board_SIZE 0.061** 0.083*** 0.200*** -0.015 -0.015 1.000
Board_IND -0.068*** 0.029 0.193*** 0.144*** -0.020 0.199*** 1.000
Board_ACT -0.070*** -0.106*** 0.087*** -0.025 -0.019 0.149*** 0.299*** 1.000
CEO_Dual 0.003 -0.045 0.001 0.026 0.009 0.022 0.077*** 0.044
Big_4 -0.004 -0.018 -0.039 -0.047** 0.040 -0.044 -0.049** 0.002
Log_ASSET -0.101*** -0.083*** -0.345*** -0.093*** 0.005 -0.355*** -0.377*** -0.350***
Debt 0.507*** 0.043 0.043 -0.056** 0.036 0.136*** 0.172*** 0.064***
ROA 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.338*** 0.111*** 0.016 -0.443*** -0.442*** -0.331***
GROWTH 0.058** 0.020 0.041 -0.030 -0.011 -0.001 0.033 0.061**
Loss 0.115*** 0.030 0.048** 0.019 0.037 0.090*** 0.152*** 0.148***
GOV_Index -0.123*** -0.087*** -0.102*** -0.030 0.017 0.047* 0.039 0.070***











Log_ASSET -0.059** 0.113*** 1.000
Debt 0.020 0.050** -0.164*** 1.000
ROA -0.065*** 0.118*** 0.274*** -0.120*** 1.000
GROWTH -0.022 -0.022 -0.059** -0.021 -0.050** 1.000
Loss 0.078*** -0.036 -0.226*** 0.213*** -0.218*** -0.057** 1.000
GOV_Index 0.043* 0.001 -0.084*** 0.119*** -0.073*** -0.033 0.157*** 1.000
Quantitative variables: Abs (DAC)it Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the Modified Jones Model; Int_OWN Internal
ownership, measured by the proportion of shares owned by managers and members of Boards (C1 %); OWN_Con Ownership Concentration,
measured by the ratio of shares held by major shareholder of the company (C5 %); Fam_OWN Family Ownership, measured by the proportion of
shares held by family members (C5 %), as a percentage of capital that is directly or indirectly in his possession; Inst_OWN Institutional
Ownership, measured by the proportion of shares held by institutional investors; Board_SIZE Size of boards of directors, measured by the total
number of members of Boards; Board_IND independence of the Board, measured by the proportion of independent members (independent
directors/total directors); Board_ACT Activity of Boards, measured by the number of meetings; Log_ASSET Firm size, measured by the natural
logarithm of total assets of the companies; Debt Level of indebtedness, measured by the quotient resulting from gross debt to total assets, ROA
Economic Return, measured by the ratio of the relation between the result before special items, interest and taxes of year t and the total net assets
at the beginning of year t; GROWTH Growth of the Companies, calculated in terms of the ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the previous
period of firm i in year t; GOV_Index The degree of law enforcement of each country analyzed, taken from the research project ‘‘Worldwide
Governance Indicators’’ (WGI) proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Dichotomous variables: Boad_IND50 Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if boards has a majority of independent directors
and, 0 otherwise; CEO_Dual Measured through a dummy variable that considers the value of 1 if there is duality of roles between the chairman
and CEO of the companies and, 0 otherwise; Big_4 Measured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firms are audited by one of the big
four firms, 0 otherwise; Loss Measured through a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the companies have had losses in the last 2 years and, 0
otherwise
*** Significant at level p B 0.01, ** significant at level p B 0.05, * significant at level p B 0.10
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